The Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) is a state-of-theart facility constructed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to process tritium for various applications and experiments at LANL. The Instrumentation and Control System (ICs) integrates all of the WETF process subsystems into a single cohesive unit. This ICs System of hardware and software provides a broad range of functions for the WETF operation, all of which must be performed under stringent safety requirements, and all of which must have a relatively high level of availability, efficiency of operations, and modifiability.
INTRODUCTION
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has processed tritium for numerous applications for many years.
The existing tritium facility was designed and constructed over 30 years ago and for much smaller quantities of tritium than are being used today. Because of the age of the facility, it does not comply with relatively new Department of Energy (DOE) safety standards specified in DOE Order 5480.1 and others.
The new Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility was designed to be able to process relatively large quantities of tritium (greater than 1,000,000 curies) and incorporates in its design all of the safety standards required under the DOE Order. Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen with a mass of three. Tritium is radioactive and has a half-life of 12.3 years, decaying by emission of a beta particle of 5.6-keV average energy.
The Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility is a state-of-the-art facility constructed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to process tritium for'various applications and experiments at LANL. The functions of this one-of-a-kind facility include many activities related to weapons, laser fusion, and accelerator research, as well as services to the Materials Science and Technology, Physics, Chemistry, Medium Physics, and Energy Divisions at LANL. One major design consideration of the facility and its process systems included a significant increase in the protection of personnel involved in tritium-handling operations, minimization of routine releases of tritiumto the environment, and minimization of the potential for a major tritium release that might result from an accident to the building, equipment failure, or human error. The critical subsystems were designed to enhance the safety of the WETF operations.
Redundancy of critical components and subassemblies was designed into these subsystems.
Operations dealing with large quantities of tritium dictated the need for better monitoring and control of the associated processes than was presently implemented in the DOE weapons complex. The method used for years--placing parts of process subsystems in a ventilation hood for personnel protection and manipulating all the valves and controls manually--was no longer acceptable. An instrumentation and control system that would greatly increase personnel safety, reliability of the process, and the efficiency of the operations for the total plant was required.
The system designed and implemented for WETF is the first system to automate and provide modern state-of-the-art technology to DOE weapons related tritium applications.
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL BYSTEM (ICs) DESIGN
IC8 System Functions. The ICs is an integrated system of hardware and software that provides a broad range of functions for the operation of the WETF. All of these functions must be performed under stringent requirements for safety, and all must have relatively high availability and modifiability.
The primary functions of the I C s that are necessary to carry out these responsibilities are: * measurement of physical parameters, * control of components, subassemblies, and systems,
Desiun considerations
All of the WETFIs processes can be classified as batch processes (as contrasted with real-time processes); therefore, no redundancy in the process control subsystem was required. The processes can be stopped with little to no deleterious effect while repairs are made to the process or ICs equipment.
However, a short mean time to repair (MTTR) philosophy was used in the overall design, which resulted in a very modular approach to the design and implementation of the ICs with adequate spares to achieve these goals. Also, redundant process control computers were implemented to increase the WETF's availability and safety.
All personnel safety related instrumentation, its interfaces to the ICs, and its data and alarm displays were implemented multi-redundantly.
A computerized system with a modern man-machine interface (MMI) affords better operational efficiency and greatly augments the reliability of the equipment configuration necessary to process tritium safely because of the hundreds of individual control operations that must be performed.
These operations must be performed in both series and parallel sequences in a relatively short span of time. Color graphics CRT displays and keyboards mounted in a control console configuration allow the operator to easily and quickly analyze and control the process. Personnel and equipment safety is also enhanced when trained operators have quick access to the process data and alarms.
Human factors engineering should be utilized in the design and layout of an ICs system, equipment, and components. The equipment of the I C s was arranged so a single operator can see all of the operational data from his normal station and be able to reach all necessary controls to operate the system. The design of the ICs is suitable for operation by an adult in the 5th to 95th percentile height range such that all tasks may be accomplished with relative ease and without strain that could induce error. . Employing a total slsystemll design concept, be it top down, bottom up, or a logical combination of both, is a major and essential consideration. This system design approach successfully bounds a problem such as adequately determining which controls should only reside in software, which should be implemented using hardware, and which require a combination of software and hardware. Other highly important system design factors that must receive conscious consideration include strict attention to subsystem interfacing impedances; circuit and subsystem grounds (digital, analog, and power); isolation of safety signals and controls; and signal shielding techniques.
There are approximately 1000 physical parameters to be measured and controlled at the WETF. These include pressure, temperature, flow, liquid level, voltage, rotational speed, displacement, weight, gas composition, frequency, position, events, time, and the concentration of tritium, oxygen, and water vapor. The remaining equipment in the DAPC Subsystem consists of a collection of transducers and controllers, interconnecting cabling between these units and major DAPC equipment components, and an assemblage of major equipment components used for conditioning, formatting, and interfacing the WETF measurement and control parameters to the Computer Subsystem. CAMAC equipment comprise the majority of the input/output (I/O) signal conditioning equipment in this subsystem.
ComDuter Subsvstem tCSS)
Two 32-bit minicomputers, an associated microcomputer, and their peripherals constitute the Computer Subsystem. The Block diagram (Fig. 3) shows the process computer and its interfaces to its peripherals and other CSS computers and equipment. The minicomputer CPU-1, is the main process control computer while the other (CPU-2) is the software development The computer and back-up for the main process computer. microcomputer (CPU-3) is referred to as the CAMAC host computer and is described below.
The process computer has a hard disk for short-term data archiving, a magnetic tape unit for loading software into the computer, The software back-up, and long term archiving activities. remaining equipment connected to this minicomputer is a system console, a logging printer and a plotter. The printer will provide a hard copy for sequential logs of alarms, operator's actions, and the WETF system performance data. The plotter will be used to copy CRT displays and to reproduce graphs of trend data.
The back-up computer is configured identically to CPU-1.
It has its own terminals and printers as peripherals and primarily will be used for software development and testing. Should CPU-1 fail, the back-up computer can be put into service and the WETF made completely operational again in less than 30 minutes. This period of time is acceptable since the WETFIs Subsystems are designed to be fail safe.
The software operating system for the minicomputers is a multitasking multi-process operating system to facilitate the real-time environment of this application. The software development computer has all the software described above for the process computer and can function as the process computer if necessary. As would be expected of a software development machine, it also has all the software tools necessary for this application.
FLIC (Fortran Language for

CAMAC Host Computer
The CAMAC host computer (CPU-3) in the control room is a 16 bit microcomputer and runs a multi-tasking operating system. This computer incorporates a hard disk, magnetic tape and system terminal.
It serves as a software development computer for the FECs and as mentioned above, automatically down line loads all the required software to the FECs upon demand. It also incorporates several different programs that at the request of the operator, can perform diagnostics on the FECs and CAMAC 1/0 modules.
Computer Communications
The seven ICs computers are linked together and communicate using ETHERNET (Fig. 4) One is the process MMI and the other is the development MMI.
The process MMI (Fig. 5) has three CRT color displays, two function button key pads, and two MMI keyboards in the operator's console. This equipment is interfaced to the process computer.
The development MMI is used with the software development computer to assist in software and display development. 
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